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FRAGMENTATION IN A POSITIVE LIGHT
Bruno Simma*
The organizers of the present symposium demonstrated a keen sense
of topicality when they chose "Diversity or Cacophony? New Sources of
Norms in International Law?" as the subject-matter of the 25th Anniversary Symposium of the Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw. For the
last decade or so, the question whether the international legal order finds
itself in the process of fragmentation, and if so, what the consequences of
this development will be, has been a popular area of study for many jurists; most of them expressing their concern about what they consider to
constitute a threat to the unity of international law-a unity which they
believe to have existed or to still exist, or towards which, in their view,
both the law-maker and the practitioner/judge ought at least to strive.
Interestingly enough, at the same time this concern is voiced, a
growing number of authors, particularly but not exclusively from
Europe, believe to perceive precisely the opposite, namely a movement
of international law towards its "constitutionalization"-by which term
these observers denote a development turning the traditional, "horizontal," minimalist international law governing more or less exclusively
relations among sovereign states in strictly bilateral ways, into something more "vertical," as it were-more densely institutionalized, more
mature, community-oriented, value-laden, peremptory and hierarchical,
according to some even quasi-federalist.
Personally, I believe that both camps are right: one and the same
international law is indeed simultaneously steering such contrary
courses-this is one of the reasons why I find our field so fascinating.
Let me mention in passing, however, that I find the "constitutionalist"
approach towards the theoretical digestion of the undeniable trends just
mentioned somewhat misguided. It forces thinking about these
developments into dogmatic structures (and strictures) that are, with
regard to many questions, alien to the field and do not contribute to their
creative-constructive handling. To give just one example, I have always
been perplexed by the readiness of quite a few of my fellow international
lawyers to accept the upgrading of the UN Security Council to the level
of, at least an embryonic, world government. To the extent that these
authors come from countries possessing a permanent seat on the
Council, I can identify some rather pragmatic reasons for their taking
this view; as to all the others, I can only explain their fascination and
eagerness to endow the activities of the Council with "constitutional"
dignity as the result of a sort of inferiority complex from which these
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international lawyers must have suffered because, after all, the law they
were taught appeared to lack almost everything which their domestic
colleagues hold to be essential for the existence of "real" law.
To return to the issue of "fragmentation" of international law, interest
in and discussion of this topic seems to have been triggered by the
increase in the number of international courts and tribunals. The
International Court of Justice appears to be the institution most concerned
about this development, as evidenced by recent speeches of certain of its
(former) Presidents before the UN General Assembly. Possessing a little
inside knowledge in this matter, I would submit that, at least until present,
and with only very few exceptions, the various judicial institutions dealing
with questions of international law have displayed utmost caution in
avoiding to contradict each other. I would go as far as claiming that if
there are international institutions that are constantly and painstakingly
aware of the necessity to preserve the coherence of international law, it is
the international courts and tribunals. Such caution might sometimes come
at the price of dodging issues that would very much have deserved to be
tackled; an example being the way in which the Hague Court in the
LaGrand case refused to decide the question whether the right of foreign
nationals to information about consular notification had assumed the
features of a human right in the context of the right to life, thus escaping
the necessity of taking a critical stand vis-a-vis an advisory opinion of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights to that effect. It took the insistence
of Mexico in the Avena case, shortly following LaGrand, to force the
International Court of Justice to unambiguously reply in the negative.
Si tacuisses. I would venture to submit that, as a rule, international judges
or arbitrators have to experience an extreme sense of urgency before they
would decide to straight-up contradict their colleagues in another
international jurisdiction. And if such sense of urgency were based on
genuine concerns about the state of development of an international legal
matter, the ensuing divergencies in international jurisprudence might be
welcome triggers of progress in the law.
On this positive note let me turn from the issue of fragmentation vel
non through the growth of international judicial institutions to questions
relating to the substance of international law. Here, too, initial and
exaggerated fears appear to gradually give way to more sober
considerations. The prime illustration of this is furnished by the
approach of the UN International Law Commission to the matter. In its
session of 2000 it first took up the question by requesting its Austrian
member, Professor Gerhard Hafner (a contributor to the present
Symposium) to produce a feasibility study on the topic of "risks ensuing
from fragmentation of international law." When the Commission started its
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actual debate two years later (in a study group which I had the pleasure to
chair), the Commission members soon agreed that the emphasis on risks
in the original title was not adequate because it depicted the phenomena
described by the term "fragmentation" in too negative a light. Thus, the
title of the topic was changed to "Fragmentation of international law:
difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international
law." Please note the Commission's move: while the term "fragmentation"
with its rather negative connotations was retained, the risks following from
it were downgraded to difficulties, such difficulties now being regarded as
arising from two developments that are described in decidedly positive
terms, namely diversification and expansion of international law. I would
suggest that the Commission's look at the matter in such a friendlier light
is typical for the treatment of the phenomenon in international legal
discourse as a whole. What frequently happens now (like in the case of the
present Symposium) is that instead of speaking of "fragmentation,"
scholars employ terms such as "diversity"; i.e., the focus now is on a
certain state of affairs, viewed in a positive light, instead of being
directed at the negative consequences, which certainly continue to exist
but do not any longer dominate the discussion.
Of course, also here beauty is in the eye of the beholder. To diagnose
a process of fragmentation at all logically presupposes that the observer
proceeds from an image of international law constituting a whole, something closed and firm, which now threatens to fall into pieces. For such
universalists the salvation is to be found in the principle that, as fragmented certain segments of international law, like WTO law for instance,
might appear, there will always be the possibility, however remote in
practice, of residual application of general international law-in other
words, the various fragments will never be totally "self-contained." For
observers like Teubner and Fischer-Lescano in the present Symposium,
which dismiss all claims of an organizational or dogmatic unity of international law from the beginning, fragmentation, or more euphemistic
ersatz terms, denote a false or non-issue. But please note that most international lawyers would not regard these two authors as "mainstream"
members of their profession. Such closing of the ranks is another, more
"personalized" method of maintaining the unity of international law.

